This article was first published in The Friday Times on 1 June 2026 and is republished here with the canonical reference to the original.
Pakistan is in the headlines for all the right reasons in the international arena, and that is refreshing for the generation that came of age in the post-9/11 world. The role of mediator between the United States and Iran that our government has taken on and continues to play has earned us goodwill around the world. If we go by recent statements from US Defence Secretary Hegseth and others, we have moved beyond the Af-Pak hyphenation in South Asia and are being viewed as a middle power with regional influence. These are all developments that should delight us. There is, however, something at home, or perhaps a great deal, that demands introspection.
This article is an attempt to dissect and understand the current trend of violence in Balochistan through both an academic and a pragmatic lens. The core idea is that the military and civilian apparatus of the state need to recognise their strengths and bring about a shift in policy in Balochistan. A confident state that knows well that a secessionist or insurgent movement cannot replace its authority operates in a manner where the focus is on winning the hearts and minds of the local population. The only model that history shows to be successful is one of reconciliation and democratic governance.
A Security Landscape at a Critical Juncture
There is no denying that Balochistan’s internal security landscape has reached a critical juncture. The province is caught in an escalatory spiral that does not align with conventional pacification strategies, and last year alone recorded 782 fatalities in terror attacks and associated security operations, according to the CRSS. The operational mechanisms employed by ethno-nationalist groups have transitioned from guerrilla raids to far more sophisticated and highly coordinated assaults against law enforcement agencies as well as civilians.
The hijacking of the Quetta-to-Peshawar Jaffar Express train in the Bolan Pass by the Baloch Liberation Army, involving over 400 passengers, along with a more recent attack on the same train in Quetta targeting military personnel, demonstrates the level of sophistication and planning with which these groups are operating.
Pakistan’s response to this increase in violence has been highly securitised, as the provincial government has taken all necessary measures to prevent further violence and, at one point, enforced strict night-time travel bans on major highways. Security operations under the national Operation Azm-e-Istehkam campaign continue to target militant networks.
These containment measures, while necessary, only treat the symptoms of the crisis rather than its root causes. It has become imperative to break this cycle of violence, look beyond tactical operations, and reform our broader strategy in line with the lessons learned from counterinsurgency efforts over many years.
The Limits of the Coercive Model
Pakistan’s kinetic policy in Balochistan aligns largely with the coercive model of counterinsurgency proposed by Trinquier, the French Army officer. He argued that the state’s primary objective in such circumstances is the destruction of any organisation that takes up arms against it and that it must be quelled with the utmost force. The focus therefore shifts to physical containment, checkpoints, population registration and strict movement controls to identify insurgents.
This approach is largely visible in the militarisation of Gwadar, the implementation of curfews and the use of targeted intelligence-based operations. These measures are necessary to degrade active militant networks in the short term, but they are unlikely to produce lasting peace and stability. There is a need for renewed focus on the political and social factors that drive the conflict.
Kilcullen demonstrated that a community’s rejection of the state is not always driven by deep ideological alignment with insurgents, which is also the case in Balochistan. It is often a defensive reaction to the disruptions caused by security operations, collateral damage, and the real or perceived heavy-handedness of state interventions.
It has been established that whenever daily life, including healthcare, socioeconomic conditions and livelihoods, is severely disrupted, friction emerges that alienates the population. In Balochistan, this has allowed groups such as the BLA-J, the Balochistan Liberation Front and the broader Baloch Raaji Aajohi Sangar coalition to falsely present themselves as defenders of the community. This, in turn, can drive further recruitment, as many individuals perceive them as their own due to familial or tribal ties.
The Reconciliation Precedents
These groups can only be defeated at an ideological and strategic level through engagement with politicians and local leaders. This is not a new prescription, as the federal government has, on at least two occasions, successfully attempted to offset its military-centric approach by offering economic packages and developmental initiatives.
In the aftermath of the operation launched against NAP, the government introduced a mass amnesty scheme in 1978 and incorporated politicians such as Bizenjo, Marri and Mengal into governance mechanisms. The second notable effort came in the form of the 2009 Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package.
The most tangible outcomes of socioeconomic development, whether proposed or implemented, emerged in 2013 when then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chief Minister Abdul Malik Baloch, working in tandem with the military, created programmes for the integration of rebel groups into the mainstream. A clear off-ramp, backed by political will, was made available to insurgent groups.
It is important to note the near absence of leaders such as the former Prime Minister and the current President, both of whom have witnessed and even led reconciliation efforts over the years. Majoritarian politics may dictate that Balochistan can be left to lower-tier party leadership or other actors, but history is unlikely to be kind to their silence at such a crucial moment. They need to play a role, alongside the military, in helping to restore peace at the highest levels.
Development Cannot Substitute for Legitimacy
It is also important to recognise that economic development cannot substitute for political legitimacy. Massive federal investment has been channelled through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the development of Gwadar Port and investment in the mining sector. However, these initiatives require a recognised political voice within the province and at the national level so that local communities feel ownership of them.
It would be a critical mistake not to highlight the role played by our adversaries, particularly India, in funding and utilising these insurgent groups for their own advantage. However, this should not become a reason to avoid engagement; rather, it should encourage those responsible to reach out. External powers can only exploit internal weaknesses.
What a Shift Would Require
Pakistan’s policy in Balochistan needs to shift from containment towards an integrated stabilisation framework led by politicians and the military at the highest level. The state must move away from top-down development packages and instead focus on building grassroots political legitimacy.
There is a need to address long-standing human rights concerns, particularly those raised domestically by civil society organisations and political parties that have long been part of the federation. The state should invest in training and equipping a locally recruited Balochistan Police force. There is also a need for a legislative framework that ensures a fixed and significant portion of revenues generated from various initiatives is allocated to the province.
None of these solutions is new. They have been discussed, debated and written about in detail by subject experts. However, there is no harm in revisiting some of the old books, charters and policy papers that may provide renewed wisdom for a situation that we may well have encountered before in our history.
Originally published in The Friday Times, 1 June 2026.
Hassan Raza is a Senior Associate at Esquare Legal, a barrister and political analyst. More of the firm’s commentary is collected in our Think Tank.